Gender Differences in Repeated Dishonest Behavior: Experimental Evidence

Subhasish Chowdhury, Joo Young Jeon, Chulyoung Kim and Sang-Hyun Kim
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Joo Young Jeon: Department of Economics, University of Reading, Reading RG6 3AA, UK

Games, 2021, vol. 12, issue 2, 1-11

Abstract: We investigate gender differences in lying behavior when the opportunity to tell lies is repeated. In specific, we distinguish the situations in which such an opportunity can be planned versus when it comes as a surprise. We utilize data from an existing published research and show that when the opportunity to tell a lie comes as a surprise, then on the first occasion, males lie more than females. However, when telling lies can be planned, then there is no gender difference in telling a lie. When planning is possible, females tell more lies in the first occasion compared to when it is not possible to plan; males do not show such behavior. On the second and final occasion, males tell more lies than females when they either could not plan but had the opportunity to a lie before, or could plan but did not have to tell a lie before. These observations can be interpreted in terms of the gender differences in consistent versus compensatory moral behavior.

Keywords: dishonesty; lying; pre-planning; gender; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Gender Differences in Repeated Dishonest Behavior: Experimental Evidence (2021)
Working Paper: Gender Differences in Repeated Dishonest Behavior: Experimental Evidence (2021)
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