A Game-Theoretic Model of Voluntary Yellow Fever Vaccination to Prevent Urban Outbreaks

Jovic Aaron S. Caasi, Brian M. Joseph, Heera J. Kodiyamplakkal, Jaelene Renae U. Manibusan, Leslie J. Camacho Aquino, Hyunju Oh, Jan Rychtář () and Dewey Taylor
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Jovic Aaron S. Caasi: Division of Mathematics and Computer Science, University of Guam, Mangilao, GU 96913, USA
Brian M. Joseph: Department of Biological Sciences, University of Notre Dame, South Bend, IN 46556, USA
Heera J. Kodiyamplakkal: College of Arts and Sciences, Vanderbilt University, 2201 West End Avenue, Nashville, TN 37235, USA
Jaelene Renae U. Manibusan: School of Engineering, University of Guam, Mangilao, GU 96913, USA
Leslie J. Camacho Aquino: Division of Mathematics and Computer Science, University of Guam, Mangilao, GU 96913, USA
Hyunju Oh: Division of Mathematics and Computer Science, University of Guam, Mangilao, GU 96913, USA
Jan Rychtář: Department of Mathematics and Applied Mathematics, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA 23284, USA
Dewey Taylor: Department of Mathematics and Applied Mathematics, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA 23284, USA

Games, 2022, vol. 13, issue 4, 1-14

Abstract: Yellow fever is a vector-borne acute viral hemorrhagic disease. It is endemic in tropical areas of Africa and Latin America but demonstrated the potential for international spread during the 2016 outbreak in Luanda, Angola. Yellow fever can be prevented by vaccination, vector control, and avoiding mosquito bites. To account for human behavior in disease dynamics, we add a game-theoretic component to a recent compartmental model of yellow fever transmission. The self-interested individuals evaluate the risks of contracting yellow fever and choose to vaccinate or avoid the bites to minimize the overall costs. We find the Nash equilibria, the optimal levels of vaccination and bite protections if the individuals can decide on the use of only one of the prevention methods as well as when they can decide on the use of both of them. In the later case, we show that vaccination is the preferred method of protection from the individual standpoint and, in the Nash equilibrium, individuals use vaccination only. Our model predicts the vaccination coverage in Angola to be around 65%, which is in reasonable agreement with the empirical value of 68%. We also study whether voluntary prevention can lead to the elimination of the disease in endemic areas. We show that voluntary vaccination alone is not enough to mitigate the risks of outbreaks, suggesting that a mandatory vaccination policy is necessary.

Keywords: game theory; vaccination games; Nash equilibria; yellow fever (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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