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Default Matters in Trust and Reciprocity

Yao Zhang, Yushu Zhang, Yan Wu (lewuyan@126.com) and Frank Krueger (fkrueger@gmu.edu)
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Yao Zhang: Department of Psychology, College of Hengyi Jing Education, Hangzhou Normal University, Hangzhou 310030, China
Yushu Zhang: Department of Psychology, College of Hengyi Jing Education, Hangzhou Normal University, Hangzhou 310030, China
Yan Wu: Department of Psychology, College of Hengyi Jing Education, Hangzhou Normal University, Hangzhou 310030, China
Frank Krueger: School of Systems Biology, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030, USA

Games, 2023, vol. 14, issue 1, 1-21

Abstract: Trust and reciprocity promote cooperation and are key elements of a successful social life. This study investigated the framing effects on trust and reciprocity behaviors. Using an iterated one-shot within-subjects design, this study explored how trust and reciprocity decisions changed when the game was framed in terms of a give (i.e., using a standard trust game with a default of no trust) and a take (e.g., using a distrust game with a default of full trust) frame. Participants of both genders first completed the scenario version of the game (Session 1), and then played the roles of trustors (Session 2) and trustees (Session 3) with human and computer-mediated human partners either in the give or take frame. Our results showed increased trust in the give than in the take frame, but only pronounced in direct interaction with human (vs. indirect computer-mediated) partners. Participants also showed higher expectations of return in the give than in the take frame. The actual reciprocity was higher in the give than in the take frame when interacting both with human and computer-mediated human partners. The results contribute to our understanding of the factors that shape trust and reciprocity and emphasize the impact of framing the default.

Keywords: trust and reciprocity; framing effects; trust game; distrust game; default (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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