Matching with Nonexclusive Contracts

Daniel Ripperger-Suhler ()
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Daniel Ripperger-Suhler: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 4600 Silver Hill Road, Suitland, MD 20746, USA

Games, 2024, vol. 15, issue 2, 1-39

Abstract: A variety of empirical papers document the coexistence of exclusive and nonexclusive contracts within a given market across a multitude of industries. However, the theoretical literature has not been able to generate a differentiable model with the coexistence of these contracts. I rectify the gap in the literature by developing a theoretical model of two-sided matching, in which principals and agents choose between exclusive and nonexclusive contracts with cost-of-effort inefficiencies. I find that the coexistence of contracts relies on cost-sharing between principals, relative bargaining power, and an endogenous outside option. I also find that the pattern of contracts is monotonic with respect to the type distributions of principals and agents.

Keywords: two-sided matching; contract theory; organizational economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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