Dynamic Vertical Foreclosure with Learning-by-Doing Production Technologies
Frago Kourandi and
Nikolaos Vettas (nvettas@aueb.gr)
Additional contact information
Frago Kourandi: Department of Economics, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 1 Sofokleous Str., 10559 Athens, Greece
Nikolaos Vettas: Department of Economics, Athens University of Economics and Business, 76 Patision Str., 10434 Athens, Greece
Games, 2024, vol. 15, issue 2, 1-23
Abstract:
Here, we study vertical foreclosure in a dynamic setup with learning-by-doing production technologies. There is a downstream monopoly and an upstream duopoly, where manufacturers produce differentiated products and can gain proficiency through the accumulation of their production. We study the dynamic interactions in the vertical chain when the monopolist sets the prices; we find that customer foreclosure may arise in equilibrium when the products are close substitutes and be welfare-enhancing. The rate of learning is lower than the social optimal and a social planner would tend to impose exclusivity more often compared to the downstream monopolist.
Keywords: dynamic interactions; learning-by-doing; exclusivity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/15/2/9/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/15/2/9/ (text/html)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jgames:v:15:y:2024:i:2:p:9-:d:1348877
Access Statistics for this article
Games is currently edited by Ms. Susie Huang
More articles in Games from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager (indexing@mdpi.com).