Can Justice and Fairness Enlarge International Environmental Agreements?

Christine Grüning and Wolfgang Peters
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Christine Grüning: Department of Business Administration and Economics, European University Viadrina, PO Box 1786, D-15207 Frankfurt (Oder), Germany
Wolfgang Peters: Department of Business Administration and Economics, European University Viadrina, PO Box 1786, D-15207 Frankfurt (Oder), Germany

Games, 2010, vol. 1, issue 2, 1-22

Abstract: The literature on International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) predicts a rather low number of signatories to an IEA. This is in sharp contrast to empirical evidence. As experimental economics provides some evidence for more complex human behavior, extending the theory of IEAs to a broader class of preferences is clearly promising. The present paper shows that where countries’ preferences incorporate justice and fairness there will be a strong incentive for them to choose similar abatement policies within and outside an IEA. Consequently, free-riding at the expense of the signatory states diminishes and participation in an IEA becomes a more successful strategy, so that the size of stable IEAs increases.

Keywords: International Environmental Agreements; coalition formation; justice and fairness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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