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Coalition Formation among Farsighted Agents

P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch

Games, 2010, vol. 1, issue 3, 1-13

Abstract: A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p belonging to P to a coalition structure outside P are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improvingpath from any coalition structure outside the set leading to some coalition structure in the set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset of P satisfying the first two conditions. A non-empty farsightedly stable set always exists. We provide a characterization of unique farsightedly stable sets of coalition structures and we study the relationship between farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest consistent set and the von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set. Finally, we illustrate our results by means of coalition formation games with positive spillovers.

Keywords: coalition formation; farsighted players; stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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Working Paper: Coalition formation among farsighted agents (2010) Downloads
Working Paper: Coalition formation among farsighted agents (2010)
Working Paper: Coalition formation among farsighted agents (2010) Downloads
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