Characterizing the Incentive Compatible and Pareto Optimal Efficiency Space for Two Players, k Items, Public Budget and Quasilinear Utilities

Anat Lerner () and Rica Gonen
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Rica Gonen: Department of Management and Economics, The Open University of Israel, 1 University Road, Raanana 4353701, Israel

Games, 2014, vol. 5, issue 2, 1-19

Abstract: We characterize the efficiency space of deterministic, dominant-strategy incentive compatible, individually rational and Pareto-optimal combinatorial auctions in a model with two players and k nonidentical items. We examine a model with multidimensional types, private values and quasilinear preferences for the players with one relaxation: one of the players is subject to a publicly known budget constraint. We show that if it is publicly known that the valuation for the largest bundle is less than the budget for at least one of the players, then Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) uniquely fulfills the basic properties of being deterministic, dominant-strategy incentive compatible, individually rational and Pareto optimal. Our characterization of the efficient space for deterministic budget constrained combinatorial auctions is similar in spirit to that of Maskin 2000 for Bayesian single-item constrained efficiency auctions and comparable with Ausubel and Milgrom 2002 for non-constrained combinatorial auctions.

Keywords: budget constraints; Pareto efficiency; incentive compatibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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