A Note on the Core of TU-cooperative Games with Multiple Membership Externalities

Heinrich H. Nax
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Heinrich H. Nax: Department of Social Sciences, ETH Zürich, Clausiusstrasse 37-C3, Zürich 8092, Switzerland

Games, 2014, vol. 5, issue 4, 1-13

Abstract: A generalization of transferable utility cooperative games from the functional forms introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior) and Lucas and Thrall (1963, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 10, 281–298) is proposed to allow for multiple membership. The definition of the core is adapted analogously and the possibilities for the cross-cutting of contractual arrangements are illustrated and discussed.

Keywords: cooperative games; core; externalities; multiple membership; stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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