Condorcet Completion Methods that Inhibit Manipulation through Exploiting Knowledge of Electorate Preferences

Richard F. Potthoff
Additional contact information
Richard F. Potthoff: Department of Political Science and Social Science Research Institute, Duke University, Erwin Mill, Duke Box 90420, Durham, NC 27708, USA

Games, 2014, vol. 5, issue 4, 1-30

Abstract: This paper attacks a problem like the one addressed in an earlier work (Potthoff, 2013) but is more mathematical. The setting is one where an election is to choose a single winner from m (> 2) candidates, it is postulated that voters have knowledge of the preference profile of the electorate, and preference cycles are limited. Both papers devise voting systems whose two key goals are to select a Condorcet winner (if one exists) and to resist manipulation. These systems entail equilibrium strategies where everyone votes sincerely, no group of voters sharing the same preference ordering can gain by deviating given that no one else deviates, and the Condorcet candidate wins. The present paper uses two unusual ballot types. One asks voters to rank the candidates with respect both to their own preferences and to their discerned order of preference of the entire electorate. The other just asks voters for their own preference ranks plus approval votes. Novel mathematical elements distinguish this paper. Its Condorcet completion methods examine all candidate triples, sometimes analyze loop(s) of some of those triples, and order candidates in a set by first determining the last-place candidate. Its non-manipulability proofs involve mathematical induction on m .

Keywords: Condorcet completion methods; strategic voting; manipulable; cyclical majorities; approval voting; mathematical induction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/5/4/204/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/5/4/204/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jgames:v:5:y:2014:i:4:p:204-233:d:41815

Access Statistics for this article

Games is currently edited by Ms. Susie Huang

More articles in Games from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().