Network Formation with Endogenous Link Strength and Decreasing Returns to Investment

Chiu Ki So
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Chiu Ki So: Department of Economics and Finance, Hang Seng Management College, Shatin, Hong Kong

Games, 2016, vol. 7, issue 4, 1-9

Abstract: We study the formation of networks where agents choose how much to invest in each relationship. The benefit that an agent can derive from a network depends on the strength of the direct links between agents. We assume that the strength of the direct link between any pair of agents is a concave function of their investments towards each other. In comparison with some existing models of network formation where the strength technology is a convex function of investment, we find that (i) the symmetric complete network can dominate the star architecture in terms of total utility; (ii) a dominating symmetric complete network needs not be stable; and, (iii) star and complete networks can be dominated by small-world networks.

Keywords: network formation; endogenous link strength; decreasing returns; small-world network (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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