Representations of Political Power Structures by Strategically Stable Game Forms: A Survey

Bezalel Peleg and Ron Holzman
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Ron Holzman: Department of Mathematics, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, 32000 Haifa, Israel

Games, 2017, vol. 8, issue 4, 1-17

Abstract: We survey the results on representations of committees and constitutions by game forms that possess some kind of equilibrium strategies for each profile of preferences of the players. The survey is restricted to discrete models, that is, we deal with finitely many players and alternatives. No prior knowledge of social choice is assumed: As far as definitions are concerned, the paper is self-contained. Section 2 supplies the necessary general tools for the rest of the paper. Each definition is followed by a simple (but nontrivial) example. In Section 3 we give a complete account of representations of committees (proper and monotonic simple games), by exactly and strongly consistent social choice functions. We start with Peleg’s representations of weak games, and then provide a complete and detailed account of Holzman’s solution of the representation problem for simple games without veto players. In Section 4 we deal with representations of constitutions by game forms. Following Gärdenfors we model a constitution by a monotonic and superadditive effectivity function. We fully characterize the representations for three kinds of equilibrium: Nash equilibrium; acceptable equilibrium (Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium); and strong Nash equilibrium. We conclude in Section 5 with a report on two recent works on representations of constitutions under incomplete information.

Keywords: committee; simple game; constitution; effectivity function; representation; game form; social choice function; equilibrium; incomplete information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Representations of Political Power Structures by Strategically Stable Game Forms: A Survey (2018)
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