Conditional Cooperation and Framing Effects
Aurélie Dariel
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Aurélie Dariel: Division of Social Science, New York University Abu Dhabi, P.O. Box 129188 Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates
Games, 2018, vol. 9, issue 2, 1-12
Abstract:
This paper presents evidence from a lab experiment investigating whether the preeminence of conditional cooperators in studies using the method of Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001, Economics Letters ) is sensitive to changes in the experimental frame. The treatments vary the framing such that the salience of conditionality to subjects is reduced. The results show that these manipulations affect the distribution of elicited types. However, there is no evidence that the framing of Fischbacher et al. overestimates the fraction of conditional cooperators compared to the other frames considered in the experiment. Furthermore, this research finds that conditional contributions elicited using the Fischbacher et al. (2001) frame are the most consistent with contributions in a one-shot public good game.
Keywords: conditional cooperation; type heterogeneity; strategy method; framing effects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jgames:v:9:y:2018:i:2:p:37-:d:151833
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