The Impacts of Green Innovation Input and Channel Service in a Dual-Channel Value Chain

Qiuxiang Li, Xingli Chen, Yimin Huang, Huangbao Gui and Shengyang Liu
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Qiuxiang Li: Institute of Management Science and Engineering, Henan University, Kaifeng 475004, China
Xingli Chen: School of Business, Henan University, Kaifeng 475004, China
Yimin Huang: School of Management & Economics, North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power, Zhengzhou 450046, China
Huangbao Gui: School of Management & Economics, North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power, Zhengzhou 450046, China
Shengyang Liu: School of Management & Economics, North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power, Zhengzhou 450046, China

IJERPH, 2019, vol. 16, issue 22, 1-26

Abstract: This paper constructs a dual-channel value chain composed of one altruistic manufacturer and one altruistic retailer, where the manufacturer makes green innovation input for green products and sells its green products to its customers through both the direct channel and the traditional channel, the retailer provides channel service for customers and sells green products through the traditional channel. We consider two scenarios in which the manufacturer and the retailer make decentralized and centralized decisions, respectively. We develop two dynamic game models for the two scenarios and analyze the dynamic behaviors of the two dynamic game models using bifurcation diagram, LLE (largest Lyapunov exponent) and attraction of basin, etc. We find that the stability region in decentralized decision model is greater than that of centralized decision, and narrow with increase of service value, green innovation input. In the decentralized decision model, the stability of the system decreases with the altruistic behavior increasing. With the price adjustment speed increasing, the dual-channel green value chain system enters into chaotic state through flip bifurcation or N-S bifurcation. In the stable state, the manufacturer and the retailer can obtain the maximum utility with the appropriate value of green innovation input. In the chaotic state, the utilities of the manufacturer and retailer are greatly affected and significantly reduced. This study will provide good guidance for sustainable development decision-making of dual-channel green value chain.

Keywords: price game; green innovation input; channel service; value chain; stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I I1 I3 Q Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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