Green Remanufacturer’s Mixed Collection Channel Strategy Considering Enterprise’s Environmental Responsibility and the Fairness Concern in Reverse Green Supply Chain

Xigang Yuan, Fei Tang, Dalin Zhang and Xiaoqing Zhang
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Xigang Yuan: Business School, Jiangsu Normal University, Xuzhou 221116, China
Fei Tang: School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China
Dalin Zhang: Department of Computer Science, Aalborg University, 9220 Aalborg Øst, Denmark
Xiaoqing Zhang: Business School, Jiangsu Normal University, Xuzhou 221116, China

IJERPH, 2021, vol. 18, issue 7, 1-18

Abstract: In reverse green supply chain, the mixed collection channel strategy of green remanufacturer is analyzed by building a dynamic game model in which we consider that the green remanufacturer undertakes the environmental responsibility and the green collector shows strong fairness concern for the profit. We analyze the impact of the environmental responsibility level of the green remanufacturer, the preference coefficient of the green remanufacturer, the fairness concern coefficient of the green collector, and the coefficient of cross collection price on optimal decision and profit of the green remanufacturer. The result shows that (1) the green remanufacturer can further improve the collection price, so that it makes many more customers participate in the collection activity; (2) the green remanufacturer pays more attention to fulfill the environmental responsibility, which will increase the intensity of collection of the waste green product, and improve the collection price, as the old green product’s remanufacturing cost is lower than the production cost of the new product, and it can improve the green remanufacturer’s profits; (3) the green remanufacturer’s profit in the mixed collection channel is higher than those in online or offline collection channels.

Keywords: fairness concern; environmental responsibility; reverse green supply chain; mixed collection channel strategy; preference coefficient; cross collection price coefficient (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I I1 I3 Q Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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