Game Analysis of the Evolution of Local Government’s River Chief System Implementation Strategy

Juan Wang, Xin Wan and Ruide Tu
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Juan Wang: School of Management, Wuhan Institute of Technology, Wuhan 430205, China
Xin Wan: Institute of Income Distribution and Public Finance, School of Taxation and Public Finance, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan 430073, China
Ruide Tu: School of Information Management, Central China Normal University, Wuhan 430079, China

IJERPH, 2022, vol. 19, issue 4, 1-13

Abstract: As the executor of the River Chief System (RCS), local governments’ choice of implementation strategies directly affects the quality of regional water environment. The implementation of the RCS involves many interest subjects, and has gradually formed a game between enterprises’ sewage management and local governments’ RCS implementation strategies, and a game between the RCS implementation strategies of different local governments. The game behavior between the interested parties is long-term and dynamic in nature. Strategies such as reducing the cost of local governments’ implementation of the RCS and increasing the rate of sewage charges will lead to the evolution of the strategy set between enterprises’ treatment of sewage and local governments’ RCS implementation in the direction of {complete treatment of sewage, strictly enforcing the RCS}. Analysis of the evolutionary game model between the local governments reveals that strategies such as reducing the weight of economic indicators in local governments’ assessment, and increasing the material and spiritual rewards for implementing the RCS, will lead to the evolutionary game outcome of implementing the RCS between the local governments in the direction of {strictly enforcing the RCS, strictly enforcing the RCS}. The external effects of sewage discharge do not affect the evolution of the game system between the local governments.

Keywords: River Chief System; evolutionary game; local government; evolutionary stabilization strategy; sewage discharge; Pareto optimal (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I I1 I3 Q Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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