EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Exploring an Efficient Evolutionary Game Model for the Government–Enterprise–Public during the Double Carbon Policy in China

Bilin Zou, Chunhua Ju, Fuguang Bao, Ye Lai, Chonghuan Xu and Yiwen Zhu
Additional contact information
Bilin Zou: School of Management and E-Business, Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou 310018, China
Chunhua Ju: School of Management and E-Business, Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou 310018, China
Fuguang Bao: School of Management and E-Business, Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou 310018, China
Ye Lai: School of Electronic and Communication Engineering, Sun Yat-sen University, Shenzhen 518107, China
Chonghuan Xu: Academy of Zhejiang Culture Industry Innovation & Development, Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou 310018, China
Yiwen Zhu: School of Chinese Language and Literature, Zhengzhou University, Zhenzhou 450000, China

IJERPH, 2022, vol. 19, issue 8, 1-27

Abstract: The realization of China’s “double carbon” goal is of great significance to the world environment and China’s economy and society. Through the establishment of the “government–enterprise–public” evolutionary game model, this paper explores the interaction between government policy guidance, low-carbon technology R&D behavior of enterprises, and public purchase of carbon label products, as well as the micro-driving path, aiming to provide suggestions for the implementation of the “double carbon” policy and carbon label system in China. The results show that the choice of government, enterprises, and public strategies is closely related to their own costs and benefits. Public sentiment can effectively urge the government to actively fulfill its responsibilities. Effective government policy guidance plays a key role in low-carbon technology R&D behavior of enterprises. There is an interaction between low-carbon technology R&D behavior of enterprises and public purchase of carbon label products.

Keywords: CPAN goals; carbon labelling system; low-carbon technology R&D; act of government; evolutionary game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I I1 I3 Q Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/19/8/4607/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/19/8/4607/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jijerp:v:19:y:2022:i:8:p:4607-:d:791657

Access Statistics for this article

IJERPH is currently edited by Ms. Jenna Liu

More articles in IJERPH from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:gam:jijerp:v:19:y:2022:i:8:p:4607-:d:791657