A Regulatory Game Analysis of Smart Aging Platforms Considering Privacy Protection

Tengfei Shi, Hanjie Xiao, Fengxia Han, Lan Chen and Jianwei Shi
Additional contact information
Tengfei Shi: Faculty of Management and Economics, Kunming University of Science and Technology, Kunming 650504, China
Hanjie Xiao: School of Economics and Management, Huzhou University, Huzhou 313000, China
Fengxia Han: Industrial Development Research Institute, Kunming University of Science and Technology, Kunming 650031, China
Lan Chen: Faculty of Management and Economics, Kunming University of Science and Technology, Kunming 650504, China
Jianwei Shi: Faculty of Management and Economics, Kunming University of Science and Technology, Kunming 650504, China

IJERPH, 2022, vol. 19, issue 9, 1-21

Abstract: Privacy and information protection are important issues in the era of big data. At present, China’s elderly care industry is gradually adopting the supply model of smart elderly care to alleviate the contradiction between supply and demand. However, the low level of regulation of smart aging platforms may lead to a low level of privacy protection on the platforms. Therefore, in this paper, based on the evolutionary game and Lyapunov theory, we discuss the willingness of elderly people to participate in regulation, the privacy protection status of platform service providers, and the degree of government regulation, as well as the key factors affecting the equilibrium of the three-party game system, and conduct simulation analysis and game system optimization using MATLAB. The simulation results show that A 1 ( 0 , 0 , 1 ) and A 5 ( 0 , 0 , 0 ) can be transformed to A 8 ( 1 , 1 , 0 ) by adjusting the parameters, i.e., the optimal ESS is participation, high-quality protection, and low investment supervision; the service income of the elderly, the loss of privacy leakage, the investment cost of service providers, and the amount of government rewards and punishments are the key factors affecting the tripartite game system. By analyzing the impact of factors, such as benefits and costs, on privacy protection and the regulation of smart senior care platforms, the level of privacy protection of smart senior care platforms can be improved and the process of the comprehensive regulation of domestic senior care services can be promoted.

Keywords: smart aging platforms; supervisory; secret protection; privacy disclosure; evolutionary game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I I1 I3 Q Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/19/9/5778/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/19/9/5778/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jijerp:v:19:y:2022:i:9:p:5778-:d:811802

Access Statistics for this article

IJERPH is currently edited by Ms. Jenna Liu

More articles in IJERPH from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().