Dual Carbon Goal-Based Quadrilateral Evolutionary Game: Study on the New Energy Vehicle Industry in China

Tao Li, Lei Ma (), Zheng Liu (), Chaonan Yi and Kaitong Liang
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Tao Li: School of Intellectual Property, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, No. 200 Xiaolingwei Street, Xuanwu District, Nanjing 210094, China
Lei Ma: School of Intellectual Property, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, No. 200 Xiaolingwei Street, Xuanwu District, Nanjing 210094, China
Zheng Liu: Centre for Innovation and Development, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Nanjing 210094, China
Chaonan Yi: School of Intellectual Property, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, No. 200 Xiaolingwei Street, Xuanwu District, Nanjing 210094, China
Kaitong Liang: School of Intellectual Property, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, No. 200 Xiaolingwei Street, Xuanwu District, Nanjing 210094, China

IJERPH, 2023, vol. 20, issue 4, 1-16

Abstract: In an effort to tackle climate change, the “Dual Carbon” target raised by the Chinese government aims to reach peak carbon dioxide emissions by 2030 and to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. Accordingly, policy incentives have accelerated the new energy vehicle (NEV) sector. Whilst previous studies have focused on the bilateral game between governments and manufacturers, NEV development has witnessed interaction among multiple players. In this paper, we construct a quadrilateral evolutionary game model, considering the impact of government policies, manufacturers’ R&D investments, dealers’ support, and consumer choice on the evolutionary stabilization strategy (ESS) in the context of China. The results show that: (1) in the absence of government incentives, there is no motivation for manufacturers, dealers and consumers to consider the development of NEVs; (2) government incentives affect manufacturers and consumers on the evolutionary paths in the short term. In the long term, benefit- and utility-based limited rationality has a dominant role in the ESS. This study contributes to the understanding of the multilateral dynamics of NEV innovation and provides important implications to practitioners and policy makers.

Keywords: Dual Carbon; new energy vehicle; innovation policy; quadrilateral evolutionary game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I I1 I3 Q Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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