Bond Issuance as Reputational Signal: Debunking the Negative Perception of Additional Liability

Dachen Sheng () and Heather A. Montgomery
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Dachen Sheng: International College of Liberal Arts, Yamanashi Gakuin University, 2-4-5 Sakaori, Kofu 400-8575, Yamanashi, Japan
Heather A. Montgomery: Department of Business & Economics, International Christian University, 3-10-2 Osawa, Mitaka 181-8585, Tokyo, Japan

IJFS, 2023, vol. 11, issue 4, 1-19

Abstract: This paper examines the determinants of bond issuance in the Chinese market and the influence of capital structure—in particular direct debt finance—on firm performance and the cost of debt. The results reveal that institutional factors in the Chinese market, in particular the involvement of the financial authority permission process during bond issuance, enhance the credibility of firms that are able to successfully issue bonds. Empirical analysis of Chinese listed manufacturing firms over the period from 2010 to 2021 demonstrates that firms with higher outstanding levels of bonds perform better and face lower costs of both bond and nonbond direct finance. We interpret this as bond issuance approval serving as a signal to markets of an implicit government guarantee on firms that are approved to issue bonds. The agency problem is analyzed using propensity-score matching and Logit analysis, revealing a trade-off between the principal–agent conflict and conflicts of interest among different shareholders when power is very concentrated through CEO duality: the CEO simultaneously serves as the chairman of the board. In large firms, as measured by total assets, the cost-reducing effect of the principal–agent problem being mitigated by CEO duality outweighs the agency costs arising from conflicts of interest between large and small shareholders, leading to an increased likelihood of successful bond issuance. However, in large firms, as measured by market capitalization, where share ownership is likely more diversified, this effect diminishes. In conclusion, this paper posits that policymakers ought to investigate strategies for granting preferential treatment to high-growth, small to mid-sized enterprises, enabling them to secure funding through direct debt financing.

Keywords: direct finance; bond; agency theorem; information asymmetry; capital structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F2 F3 F41 F42 G1 G2 G3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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