A Nontechnical Guide on Optimal Incentives for Islamic Insurance Operators

Hayat Khan

JRFM, 2019, vol. 12, issue 3, 1-14

Abstract: The takaful industry is searching for an optimal model for Islamic insurance operation, which has turned out to be a challenging task. This paper translates the abstract scientific knowledge accumulated in the optimal contracting literature into a simple, nontechnical, analytical framework to analyze alternative business models which could be used by regulators to align the best interest of shareholders and policyholders in the takaful industry. This paper shows that the wakalah – surplus-sharing hybrid serves as the optimal structure for takaful operation; in the presence of Akerlof’s (1982) gift-exchange, the wakalah fee reduces the adverse selection problem; and the wakalah fee could be used to protect infant takaful operators.

Keywords: Islamic insurance; takaful guidelines; optimal incentives; wakalah; mudarabah; surplus-sharing; regulations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C E F2 F3 G (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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