An Optimal Compensation Agency Model for Sustainability under the Risk Aversion Utility Perspective

Tyrone Lin () and Tsai-Ling Liu
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Tsai-Ling Liu: Department of International Business, National Dong Hwa University, Hualien 97401, Taiwan

JRFM, 2021, vol. 14, issue 3, 1-16

Abstract: This paper explores how to construct a fair and optimal compensation system between the principal and the agent in the face of financial compensation agency problems during a limited period in relation to the concept of sustainability. In the construction of the principal’s compensation system, the agent’s degree of operational financial effort will affect the overall revenue function for reaching sustainability. Both the principal and the agent have a maximum expected utility in the negative exponential pattern of the general hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) utility function that satisfies their respective objective functions. The proposed model and numerical example analysis results prove that the compensation system for sustainability can provide a fair and optimal financial system, from a sustainability perspective. The main contribution of this study is the construction and development of an optimal compensation agency model for risk management, which is derived by considering the effect of risk aversion utility on revenue. The proposed model can provide a fair and feasible approach within the issue of compensation, from the viewpoint of sustainability, for an optimal compensation agency problem.

Keywords: financial; risk; management; sustainability; optimal compensation system; agency problem; HARA utility; risk management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C E F2 F3 G (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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