The Sense of Cooperation on Interdependent Networks Inspired by Influence-Based Self-Organization

Xiaopeng Li, Zhonglin Wang, Jiuqiang Liu and Guihai Yu ()
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Xiaopeng Li: College of Big Data Statistics, Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, Guiyang 550025, China
Zhonglin Wang: College of Big Data Statistics, Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, Guiyang 550025, China
Jiuqiang Liu: College of Big Data Statistics, Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, Guiyang 550025, China
Guihai Yu: College of Big Data Statistics, Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, Guiyang 550025, China

Mathematics, 2023, vol. 11, issue 4, 1-16

Abstract: Influence, as an inherently special attribute, is bound to profoundly affect a player’s behavior. Meanwhile, a growing body of studies suggests that interactions among networks may be more important than isolated ones. Thus, we try our best to research whether such a setup can stimulate the sense of cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma games through the co-evolution of strategy imitation and interdependence networks structures. To be specific, once a player’s influence exceeds the critical threshold τ , they will be permitted to build a connection with the corresponding partner on another network in a self-organized way, thus gaining additional payoff. However, a player’s influence changes dynamically with the spread of strategy, resulting in time-varying connections between networks. Our results show that influence-based self-organization can facilitate cooperation, even under quite poor conditions, where cooperation cannot flourish in a single network. Furthermore, there is an optimal threshold τ to optimize the evolution of cooperation. Through microcosmic statistical analysis, we are surprised to find that the spontaneous emergence of connections between interdependence networks, especially those between cooperators, plays a key role in alleviating social dilemmas. Finally, we uncover that if the corresponding links between interdependence networks are adjusted to random ones, the evolution of cooperation will be blocked, but it is still better than relying on simple spatial reciprocity on an isolated lattice.

Keywords: evolution of cooperation; co-evolution; prisoner’s dilemma game; interdependent networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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