The Influences of Asymmetric Market Information on the Dynamics of Duopoly Game

Sameh S. Askar
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Sameh S. Askar: Department of Statistics and Operations Research, College of Science, King Saud University, Riyadh 11451, Saudi Arabia

Mathematics, 2020, vol. 8, issue 7, 1-12

Abstract: We investigate the complex dynamic characteristics of a duopoly game whose players adopt a gradient-based mechanism to update their outputs and one of them possesses in some way certain information about his/her opponent. We show that knowing such asymmetric information does not give any advantages but affects the stability of the game’s equilibrium points. Theoretically, we prove that the equilibrium points can be destabilized through Neimark-Sacker followed by flip bifurcation. Numerically, we prove that the map describing the game is noninvertible and gives rise to several stable attractors (multistability). Furthermore, the dynamics of the map give different shapes of quite complicated attraction basins of periodic cycles.

Keywords: Duopoly game; Bounded rational players; Asymmetric information; Neimark-Sacker bifurcation; Critical curves; Noninvertible map (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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