An Empirical Study on Optimal Strategies of Industry-University-Institute Green Innovation with Subsidy
Wenqing Wu,
Kexin Yu,
Saixiang Ma,
Chien-Chi Chu,
Shijie Li,
Chengcheng Ma and
Sang-Bing Tsai
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Wenqing Wu: College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China
Kexin Yu: College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China
Saixiang Ma: College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China
Chien-Chi Chu: Department of Finance, Business School of Shantou University, Shantou 515063, China
Shijie Li: School of Business Administration, Guangdong University of Finance and Economics, Guangzhou 510320, China
Chengcheng Ma: Business School, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China
Sang-Bing Tsai: Zhongshan Institute, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Zhongshan 528400, China
Sustainability, 2018, vol. 10, issue 5, 1-17
Abstract:
With the increasing awareness of environmental protection and the complexity and rapid change of technological innovation, more and more enterprises seek to develop and research (R&D) institutions to cooperate with green innovation. In order to promote the cooperation efficiency of green innovation, this paper develops a multi-stage game model to analyze the optimal strategies of the enterprise, the university and the policy-maker with consumer learning and government subsidy. Then the paper compares the difference of optimal subsidy between the single-stage green innovation cooperation and the multi-stage green innovation cooperation. The research shows that consumers’ initial learning factors and green innovation cooperation cycle have a significant impact on the optimal input level of the enterprise and the university and also have a significant impact on the optimal subsidy of the government. The specific government subsidy and subsidy ratio depend on the comprehensive role of consumer learning factors and the green innovation cooperation cycle. In the end, we propose that the government should subsidize the university at times when the initial consumer learning factor is low; the government subsidy should be properly lagged when the initial consumer learning factor is high.
Keywords: industry-university-institute cooperation; green innovation; consumer learning; government subsidy; game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:10:y:2018:i:5:p:1667-:d:148223
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