Pricing Decision for Reverse Logistics System under Cross-Competitive Take-Back Mode Based on Game Theory

Dingzhong Feng, Xinghui Yu, Yongbo Mao, Yangke Ding, Ye Zhang and Zhiyan Pan
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Dingzhong Feng: College of Mechanical Engineering, Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou 310014, China
Xinghui Yu: College of Mechanical Engineering, Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou 310014, China
Yongbo Mao: College of Mechanical Engineering, Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou 310014, China
Yangke Ding: College of Mechanical Engineering, Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou 310014, China
Ye Zhang: College of Mechanical Engineering, Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou 310014, China
Zhiyan Pan: College of Environment, Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou 310014, China

Sustainability, 2019, vol. 11, issue 24, 1-20

Abstract: Considering the reverse logistics system composed of two manufacturers and two recyclers under the cross-competitive take-back mode, which is influenced by multiple factors (industry competition, economies of scale, government subsidies, remanufacturing rate, etc.), a model for remanufacturing reverse logistics system based on Stackelberg game is established. Then, the Nash equilibrium solution of decision variables is solved to obtain the best profit of all participants under the cross-competitive take-back mode. Furthermore, the parameter constraint analysis is carried out, and the monopolistic take-back mode is introduced for comparative analysis. Then, the sensitivity analysis of the model is carried out. At last, a case analysis is carried out based on the current situation of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) recycling in China. The results show that the cross-competitive take-back mode is more advantageous to all participants in the reverse logistics system than the monopolistic take-back mode. Recyclers should actively sign contracts with multiple manufacturers to recycle waste products, making full use of the advantages of cross-competitive take-back mode to maximize the profits of all participants, so as to encourage them to recycle waste products and achieve sustainable development.

Keywords: remanufacturing; reverse logistics; take-back modes; Stackelberg game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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