Multi-Evolutionary Game Research on Heavy Metal Pollution Control in Soil: Based on a Third-Party Perspective

Songtao Xu, Zhifang Zhou and Ke Liu
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Songtao Xu: School of Accounting, Jiujiang University, Jiujiang 332005, China
Zhifang Zhou: School of Business, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China
Ke Liu: School of Business, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China

Sustainability, 2020, vol. 12, issue 13, 1-20

Abstract: The introduction of third-party governance models for the treatment of soil heavy metal pollution has promoted the marketization, professionalization, and efficiency of pollution treatment, but also can result in distortions of relevant stakeholder relationships and conflicts of interest. The game relationship among the government, soil-polluting companies, and third-party governance companies may solve the practical dilemma of comprehensive management of soil heavy metal pollution and establish a good cooperative mechanism. We constructed a three-party evolutionary game model to analyze the interaction mechanism of each agent’s strategy choice as well as the evolution of each agent’s strategy choice under different parameter trends and simulation analyses. The research showed that the amount of fines and supervision costs, rent-seeking costs and governance costs, and government subsidies and rent-seeking benefits were key factors affecting the evolution and stability strategies of government departments, soil-polluting companies, and third-party governance companies. By cooperating with third-party governance companies, the government can effectively suppress the improper behavior of soil-polluting companies. The conclusions of the study are helpful to broaden the research boundary of soil heavy metal pollution treatment and provide theoretical guidance for the treatment of soil heavy metal pollution in China.

Keywords: treatment of soil heavy metal pollution; third-party governance; evolutionary game; simulation analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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