Optimal Politics of Conflict over Physical-Industrial Development Using a Technique of Cooperative Game Theory in Iran

Samaneh Zahedi, Amir Hedayati Aghmashhadi and Christine Fürst
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Samaneh Zahedi: Environmental Management, Islamic Azad University, Tehran Science and Research Branch, Tehran 1477893855, Iran
Amir Hedayati Aghmashhadi: Department of Environmental Science and Engineering, Faculty of Agriculture and Environment, Arak University, Arak 3848177584, Iran
Christine Fürst: Department of Sustainable Landscape Development, Institute of Geosciences and Geography, Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg, German Centre for Integrative Biodiversity Research (iDiv) Halle-Jena-Leipzig, 06120 Halle, Germany

Sustainability, 2021, vol. 13, issue 22, 1-20

Abstract: One of the most important parameters for economic growth is industrial development in many developing regions like Iran. The Markazi province in the center of Iran is one of the most important industrial areas in the country, where unplanned economic development in recent decades has led to many social and environmental problems. Accordingly, the main organizations involved in industrial development in this region are facing difficulties in the future development of industrial areas, which has become a complex problem. Therefore, the main purpose of this paper is to study the industrial development dispute in the Markazi province through a cooperative model of game theory in order to achieve conflict resolution through a comprehensive approach. In this research, the conflict has been analyzed through strategic analysis of stakeholders. For this purpose, a model of cooperative game theory and its bargaining analysis methods, including social choice rules (SCRs) and fallback bargaining (FB), and six available options were used. According to the six SCRs, the most likely option that can exist between the Department of the Environment (DOE) and the Industrial and Mining Organization (IMO) is compromise coordination (C). In addition, the results of the Fallback Bargaining (FB) rule in three different forms show that the most appropriate options for agreement between the IMO and DOE are the moderate version of construction through arbitration (TCa) and compromise coordination (C). In fact, the results indicate that if the actors involved in this conflict do not cooperate to resolve it, it can lead to more complex problems and the involvement of other groups who may not even have a proper perception of the conflict. In addition, the findings show that cooperation between the parties and understanding of their positions and views along with the policy coherence are necessary to strive for sustainable development and maintain economic growth and development.

Keywords: industrial development; conflict resolution; cooperative game theory; Iran (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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