The Tripartite Evolution Game of Environmental Governance under the Intervention of Central Government

Yongming Zhu, Lanxiao Niu, Zheyun Zhao and Jing Li
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Yongming Zhu: Department of Management Engineering, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001, China
Lanxiao Niu: Department of Management Engineering, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001, China
Zheyun Zhao: School of Marxism, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001, China
Jing Li: Department of Management Engineering, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001, China

Sustainability, 2022, vol. 14, issue 10, 1-19

Abstract: Environmental pollution management is about the sustainable development effects of enterprises and the quality of life of people. However, the frequent occurrence of various types of enterprises polluting the environment in recent years has revealed many problems, such as the lack of monitoring by relevant central agencies, the ineffective supervision by local governments, and the failure of public complaints. This paper considers the rent-seeking phenomenon of enterprises in pollution prevention and control, constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model between enterprises, local governments and central government, analyzes the evolutionary stability of each participant’s strategy choice, explores the relationship between the influence of each factor on the strategy choice of the three parties, and further analyzes the stability of the equilibrium point in the tripartite game system. The results show that there is no evolutionary equilibrium strategy in the current Chinese environmental governance system; the reward and punishment policies of the local government and central government have a guiding effect on the strategy choices of enterprises in a short period of time, but the guiding effect will gradually weaken after a period of time, and cannot completely curb the irregular strategies of enterprises; the dynamic reward scheme can effectively alleviate the fluctuation of the game system and make the strategy choices of enterprises converge to the ideal state.

Keywords: environmental governance; dynamic rewards and punishments; simulation analysis; tripartite evolution game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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