Dynamic Differential Game Strategy of the Energy Big Data Ecosystem Considering Technological Innovation
Jun Dong,
A-Ru-Han Bao,
Yao Liu,
Xi-Hao Dou,
Dong-Ran Liu and
Gui-Yuan Xue
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Jun Dong: Department of Economic Management, North China Electric Power University, Beijing 102206, China
A-Ru-Han Bao: Department of Economic Management, North China Electric Power University, Beijing 102206, China
Yao Liu: Department of Economic Management, North China Electric Power University, Beijing 102206, China
Xi-Hao Dou: Department of Economic Management, North China Electric Power University, Beijing 102206, China
Dong-Ran Liu: Department of Economic Management, North China Electric Power University, Beijing 102206, China
Gui-Yuan Xue: Economic Research Institute, State Grid Jiangsu Electric Power Co., Ltd., Nanjing 210008, China
Sustainability, 2022, vol. 14, issue 12, 1-24
Abstract:
This study discusses how to create strategic value through energy big data and how to promote stakeholder interaction mechanisms in the evolution of the energy big data ecosystem. We use differential game methods to study the interaction between one power grid enterprise (PG) and one technology supplier (TS) under three different cost-sharing contracts: without cost-sharing contract, cost-sharing contract, and two-way subsidy contract. The effectiveness of the dynamic equilibrium strategies under different contracts is verified via numerical simulations. The results show that under the centralized decision scenario, the technological innovation investment, the degree of technological advancement of PG and TS, and the total profit of the supply chain system are superior to the decentralized decision scenario. The extent of TS technology innovation investment depends on the share rate of PG. Technology innovation investment and the profits of energy big data service supply chain stakeholders will increase with the sensitivity coefficient of technological advancement. Compared with contracts without cost-sharing and with cost-sharing, the two-way subsidy contract can provide the Pareto optimal solution for the investment trajectory of technological innovation and long-term profits. Theoretically, this study reveals a new perspective in the research on the relationship between power grid enterprises and technology suppliers under dynamic technology innovation. In practice, this study facilitates power grid enterprises and technology suppliers to form a closer cooperative relationship in the energy big data ecosystem. More importantly, it is helpful for power grid enterprises to make optimal transaction decisions at different stages of energy big data ecosystem evolution.
Keywords: big data service; differential game; energy big data ecosystem evolutionary framework; supply chain coordination; technology innovation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:14:y:2022:i:12:p:7158-:d:836228
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