Research on the Emission Reduction Decision of Cost-Sharing Logistics Service Supply Chain in the O2O Model

Guangsheng Zhang, Xiao Wang (), Yu Zhang and Jiayun Kang
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Guangsheng Zhang: College of Business Administration, Shandong Management University, Jinan 250357, China
Xiao Wang: International Business School Suzhou, Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, Suzhou 215123, China
Yu Zhang: Hunter Centre for Entrepreneurship, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow G4 0QU, UK
Jiayun Kang: Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool, Liverpool L69 3BX, UK

Sustainability, 2022, vol. 14, issue 20, 1-21

Abstract: As an effective way to realize energy savings and environmental protection, cost sharing is gradually becoming an important measure to reduce emissions in the logistics service supply chain under O2O mode in recent years. How to conduct contract selection and design optimization under the cost-sharing situation, and then improve the operational efficiency of the logistics service supply chain is an important issue that needs to be addressed. Firstly, based on the initial market demand for logistics, this paper involves the influence of both online logistics service integrators and onsite functional logistics service providers on logistics market demand in terms of emission reduction and platform brand image and develops a model based on the logistics service demand function in the O2O mode. Secondly, for the role of online and onsite emission reduction services in multi-cycle continuous cooperation to enhance the platform integrator’s brand image, a cost-sharing differential game model between online and onsite services is developed to facilitate providers’ adoption of high-quality emission reduction services. Finally, the HJB equation is used to compare the non-cooperative Nash game, the cost-sharing Stackelberg game, and the cooperative game to make the optimal abatement decision, the optimal benefit, and the cost-sharing ratio of the abatement service supply chain in the non-cooperative Nash game, the cost-sharing Stackelberg game, and the cooperative game. By comparing the results of the three games, we find that the optimal onsite and online abatement service decision is related to the cost, marginal revenue, and the impact of the service on demand; the abatement cost-sharing contract and cooperation are both better than the non-cooperative independent decision state, which can effectively guide the provision of high-quality onsite abatement service and improve the revenue of both parties involved in the logistics service supply chain and the total system’s revenue in the O2O mode. Compared with the cooperative game model, the cost-sharing contract can more effectively facilitate close cooperation between the actors, and the relationship between onsite and online marginal revenue affects the improvement of both parties’ revenue. The findings of the study can provide useful managerial insights for the selection and design optimization of abatement contracts for logistics service supply chains considering cost-sharing via the O2O model.

Keywords: logistics service supply chain; cost sharing; emission reduction services; platform brand; O2O model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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