Choice of Emission Control Technology in Port Areas with Customers’ Low-Carbon Preference

Haiying Zhou () and Wenjing Zhang
Additional contact information
Haiying Zhou: Department of Port and Shipping Management, Guangzhou Maritime University, Guangzhou 510725, China
Wenjing Zhang: Department of Port and Shipping Management, Guangzhou Maritime University, Guangzhou 510725, China

Sustainability, 2022, vol. 14, issue 21, 1-19

Abstract: The choice of emission control technology in a port supply chain under a cap-and-trade scheme considering low-carbon preferences of customers, is explored in this study. In port areas, the port supply chain consisting of one port and one ship can adopt either shore power (SP) or low sulfur fuel oil (LSFO) to reduce emissions. The economic and social performance of the port supply chain when either SP or LSFO is implemented is compared under three different game models (port-leader Stackelberg game, ship-leader Stackelberg game and the Nash game). The obtained results show that the profits and emissions in the Nash game are higher than those in the other two games. When environmental concern is relatively small, social welfare in the Nash game is the highest, while social welfare in the one-party-dominant structure is superior to that in the Nash structure, under high environmental concern. When the customers’ low-carbon preferences and carbon prices are low, both the supply chain’s profits and carbon emissions when LSFO is used are higher than those from using SP. From the perspective of social welfare maximization, in general, LSFO is preferred when carbon price, customers’ low-carbon preference and environmental concern are all low or are all high. Otherwise, SP is the optimal decision. The findings can provide insights for governments in formulating emission control policies according to their own interests.

Keywords: cap-and-trade scheme; emission control technology; low-carbon preference of customers; carbon emissions; social welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/14/21/13816/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/14/21/13816/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:14:y:2022:i:21:p:13816-:d:952305

Access Statistics for this article

Sustainability is currently edited by Ms. Alexandra Wu

More articles in Sustainability from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().