Influence of the Government Department on the Production Capacity Reserve of Emergency Enterprises Based on Multi-Scenario Evolutionary Game

Xinshang You, Shuo Zhao (), Yanbo Yang and Dongli Zhang ()
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Xinshang You: School of Economics and Management, Hebei University of Science and Technology, Shijiazhuang 050018, China
Shuo Zhao: School of Economics and Management, Hebei University of Science and Technology, Shijiazhuang 050018, China
Yanbo Yang: School of Economics and Management, Hebei University of Science and Technology, Shijiazhuang 050018, China
Dongli Zhang: School of Economics and Management, Hebei University of Science and Technology, Shijiazhuang 050018, China

Sustainability, 2022, vol. 14, issue 23, 1-35

Abstract: With the frequent occurrence of world emergency events, the emergency management of government departments in various countries is facing great challenges. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the shortage of various emergency resources is prominent, and the emergency supplies reserve combined by governments and enterprises is an important guarantee for dealing with emergency management problems. This paper mainly studies the impact of a government sustainability-oriented innovation policy on the production capacity reserve of security emergency enterprises (SEEs), and constructs an evolutionary game model between the local government and SEEs. Then, it focuses on the impact of a reputation mechanism on the government enterprise cooperative reserve. According to the condition of a country, the central government’s punishment mechanism is introduced, and the evolutionary and stable strategies of the behavior choices of the local government and SEEs are compared and analyzed. Combined with the evolution degree of emergency events, the numerical simulation analysis is used to deduce and simulate the multi scenario of the example model. The results show that the reputation mechanism can effectively promote the evolution of government and enterprises to the ideal state under various scenarios. When the punishment intensity of the central government is higher than the total benefit of the implementation of the mere formality policy by the local government, it can effectively prevent the omission of the local government. This study provides a new idea for the government to formulate reasonable policies to promote SEEs to reserve production capacity, which is more conducive to government enterprise cooperation to deal with emergency events.

Keywords: emergency events; emergency supplies reserve; government policy; evolutionary game model; scenario analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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