Carbon Emission Efficiency Network: Evolutionary Game and Sensitivity Analysis between Differentiated Efficiency Groups and Local Governments

Renjie Zhang, Hsingwei Tai, Kuotai Cheng, Huizhong Dong, Wenhui Liu and Junjie Hou
Additional contact information
Renjie Zhang: China Aerospace Academy of Systems Science and Engineering, Beijing 100089, China
Hsingwei Tai: School of Civil and Architectural Engineering, Shandong University of Technology, Zibo 255000, China
Kuotai Cheng: Department of Environmental and Cultural Resources, National Tsing Hua University, Hsinchu 300044, Taiwan
Huizhong Dong: School of Management, Shandong University of Technology, Zibo 255000, China
Wenhui Liu: School of Academy of Fine Arts, Shandong University of Technology, Zibo 255000, China
Junjie Hou: China Aerospace Academy of Systems Science and Engineering, Beijing 100089, China

Sustainability, 2022, vol. 14, issue 4, 1-19

Abstract: With its proposal of the “double carbon” (peak carbon dioxide emissions and carbon neutralization) goal, China has entered a new stage in creating an ecological civilization and achieving sustainable development. Based on the formation and evolution mechanism of the carbon emission efficiency network, in this study, a trilateral evolutionary game model—including efficiency groups (high- and low-efficiency groups) and local governments—was constructed, in an attempt to discuss the conditions needed for different players and trilateral interconnected systems to implement balanced and stable strategies. Furthermore, the sensitivity of the participants’ evolutionary trajectories toward factors such as the initial strategy ratio, transition cost, and network capital were tested via a system simulation. The main conclusions were as follows: (1) Efficiency groups form a virtuous circle when the initial proportion of the participants’ strategies reaches a certain threshold, and converge into a stable “win–win” state. Under these circumstances, high-efficiency groups tend to give full play to their efficiency advantages in terms of carbon emission reduction and green development, while low-efficiency groups tend to choose green transformation and accept the spillover effect from high-efficiency groups. (2) When efficiency groups achieve a “win–win” state or form good self-management, local governments move from active supervision to a passive supervision strategy in order to reduce supervision costs. (3) While different initial strategy proportions do not affect the stable convergence point of the evolutionary system, they have a differentiated impact on the convergence speed of the players. Under the condition of a low initial strategy ratio, transformation costs can reduce the green transformation enthusiasm of inefficient groups, while network capital can enhance the green transformation willingness of inefficient groups.

Keywords: trilateral evolutionary game; carbon emission efficiency; carbon emission; network capital; stabilization strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/14/4/2191/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/14/4/2191/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:14:y:2022:i:4:p:2191-:d:749677

Access Statistics for this article

Sustainability is currently edited by Ms. Alexandra Wu

More articles in Sustainability from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().