Risk Perception Thresholds and Their Impact on the Behavior of Nearby Residents in Waste to Energy Project Conflict: An Evolutionary Game Analysis

Xiongwei Quan, Gaoshan Zuo and Helin Sun
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Xiongwei Quan: School of Business, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China
Gaoshan Zuo: School of International Business, Beijing Foreign Studies University, Beijing 100089, China
Helin Sun: School of Business, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China

Sustainability, 2022, vol. 14, issue 9, 1-20

Abstract: In China, waste to energy (WTE) projects are currently considered the best choice for dealing with municipal solid waste (MSW), but their siting often leads to conflicts. The perceptions of proximate residents to the changes and uncertainty induced by WTE projects are the main reasons for such conflicts. Determining the indicators used to measure these changes is crucial for an evaluation of surrounding residents’ risk perception. One indicator is residents’ risk perception thresholds. Our paper employs evolutionary game theory to deduce the risk perception threshold of surrounding residents related to a WTE project, which provides a novel contribution to the literature. The results of a case study and simulations show that the level of the risk perception threshold has a crucial effect on the behavior choices of surrounding residents. Two important parameters that affect the value of this risk perception threshold are possible economic compensation and possible resistance costs. A change to the values of these two parameters can change the value of the risk perception threshold of nearby residents. If the change in the risk perceived by surrounding residents is lower than the threshold they can tolerate, they will accept construction of the project. However, if surrounding residents are worried about this risk fluctuating as a result of construction of the plant, they will behave more cautiously and conservatively, and if the possible risk exceeds the threshold that they are willing to tolerate, then they will boycott the plan and protest against the construction of the project. In this case, the surrounding residents will still show restraint. This study tries to provide a theoretical and practical basis for effective resolution by government of the public’s risk concerns and existing or imminent conflicts.

Keywords: waste to energy project; risk perception; threshold; evolutionary game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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