Promoting Construction Labor Professionalization: An Evolutionary Game Perspective
Wei Chen,
Zhuzhang Yang (whut_yzz@163.com),
Hang Yan and
Ying Zhao
Additional contact information
Wei Chen: School of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430070, China
Zhuzhang Yang: School of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430070, China
Hang Yan: School of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430070, China
Ying Zhao: School of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430070, China
Sustainability, 2023, vol. 15, issue 12, 1-20
Abstract:
A shortage of skilled laborers has constrained the new development path called Construction 4.0, which is proposed to improve the construction industry with advanced technologies. It should be noted that the mismatch between labor skills and technological progress will harm the sustainable development of the construction sector. In China, a three-tier management structure consisting of contractors, labor subcontractors, and laborers is widespread in the labor market. Considering the relationship between laborers and construction firms, promoting construction labor professionalization depends on the cooperation of general contractors and labor subcontractors. Previous studies have focused on training techniques and methods, but have neglected to investigate whether stakeholders are willing to cooperate in training labor. Considering that the standard workforce is more likely to receive human resource investment, this paper aims to analyze the strategic choice of related stakeholders in cultivating the standard workforce. Since evolutionary game theory has proven to be an effective method to study the symbiotic evolution between stakeholders, this paper will apply it to develop an evolutionary game model and conduct analysis. Moreover, this research examines how government incentive policy affects the dynamic evolution process of cultivating a standard workforce. The results suggest that without government incentives, general contractors and labor subcontractors tend to choose a contingent workforce. When the government subsidy reaches a certain level, general contractors and labor subcontractors are willing to cooperate in cultivating a standard workforce. Additionally, it is worth noting that compensation for labor subcontractors is relatively more effective than that for general contractors in promoting construction labor professionalization. Furthermore, some suggestions and countermeasures are proposed to help to cultivate a standard workforce in China.
Keywords: construction industry; labor professionalization; general contractors; labor subcontractors; government; evolutionary game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/15/12/9688/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/15/12/9688/ (text/html)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:15:y:2023:i:12:p:9688-:d:1172971
Access Statistics for this article
Sustainability is currently edited by Ms. Alexandra Wu
More articles in Sustainability from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager (indexing@mdpi.com).