Quadripartite Evolutionary Game of Incentives for Green Retrofitting of Historical Buildings

Dong Zheng, Hejun Xu (), Shoaib Ali, Zhifu Jia and Xiaojun Ma
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Dong Zheng: School of Law, Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing 210046, China
Hejun Xu: School of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Jiangsu University of Science and Technology, Zhenjiang 212000, China
Shoaib Ali: School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, China
Zhifu Jia: School of Sciences and Arts, Suqian University, Suqian 223800, China
Xiaojun Ma: School of Mathematics and Statistics, Shanxi Datong University, Datong 037009, China

Sustainability, 2024, vol. 16, issue 23, 1-27

Abstract: Green retrofitting is a potent strategy to improve energy efficiency and support the cultural conservation of historical buildings. China has many historical buildings with significant potential for green retrofitting. Nevertheless, the Chinese green retrofit industry remains in its early stages due to the lack of a comprehensive promotion mechanism. Drawing upon evolutionary game theory, an evolutionary game model was formulated to analyze the interplay among governmental regulators, Energy Service Companies (ESCOs), the owners of historical buildings, and tourists. At an extreme disturbance intensity of 100%, a striking decline is observed in the likelihood of ESCOs maintaining the “green retrofit” strategy, with the probability dropping to a minimum of 24.68%. Under specific conditions however this interplay attains an optimal equilibrium state, denoted as (1,1,1,1). It is concluded that governmental regulators exhibit a greater degree of stability compared to other stakeholders, as they maintain their strategies despite external disturbances. Therefore, it is recommended that effective incentives and regulatory frameworks should consider the sensitivities of non-regulatory stakeholders to enhance the success of green retrofitting projects for historical buildings.

Keywords: green building technologies; green retrofit; evolutionary game theory; cost-benefit analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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