Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Green Coal Mining: Insights from Central Environmental Protection Inspection

Shaohui Zou and Jiahang Xie ()
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Shaohui Zou: School of Management, Xi’an University of Science and Technology, Xi’an 710054, China
Jiahang Xie: School of Management, Xi’an University of Science and Technology, Xi’an 710054, China

Sustainability, 2024, vol. 16, issue 24, 1-25

Abstract: This paper constructs an evolutionary game model involving the “central government–local government–coal enterprises” to explore the impact mechanism of central environmental protection inspection on green coal mining. By analyzing the strategic behaviors of the key actors, this study identifies critical factors that influence their decisions. System simulations are conducted to assess the effects of key parameters on system stability and convergence. The findings indicate the following: (1) Increasing inspection costs weaken the central government’s support for green mining, with excessive costs potentially causing regulatory fatigue. Moderating inspection investments is key to sustaining long-term effectiveness. (2) Higher penalties for local governments improve the enforcement of green mining policies, particularly in the mid-term, showing that stringent penalties are an effective regulatory tool. (3) Lower technical costs and greater economic incentives encourage coal enterprises to adopt green mining practices, highlighting the role of innovation and profitability in driving green transitions. (4) Central government subsidies enhance local governments’ short-term enforcement but may lead to dependence if overused. Balanced subsidy policies are essential for sustained policy implementation at the local level. Based on these findings, the paper proposes policy recommendations to improve inspection mechanisms, optimize policy tools, and establish a collaborative regulatory system to ensure the long-term effectiveness of green coal mining.

Keywords: green coal mining; central environmental protection inspection; supervision costs; tripartite evolutionary game; simulation analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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