Corruption as Betrayal: Experimental Evidence on Corruption Under Delegation

Nicolas Jacquemet ()

No 506, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: We consider corruption behavior in a three-players game : Principal, Agent, Corrupter. When the Principal chooses a fair wage, the Agent faces con°icting interests to reciprocate. This delegation effect is expected to lower the level of corruption as compared to what arises in two-players settings. We set up two experiments varying in the exogeneity of the delegation relationship. The experimental evidence supports the delegation effect. This, in turn, could account for the deterrence effect of wage on corruption even in the absence of detection.

Keywords: Corruption; Reciprocity; Enforcement; Principal-Agents relationship (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L10 L11 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2005-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Working Paper: Corruption as Betrayal: Experimental Evidence on Corruption Under Delegation (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gat:wpaper:0506

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