Monopolization through acquisitions in a differentiated product industry

Emilie Dargaud

No 507, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: This article analyzes the incentive to merge in a context of price competition with horizontal product differentiation. In contrast to the results obtained by Kamien and Zang (1990), we show that merged equilibria can appear in this game. Moreover monopolization of the industry occurs with a high number of firms.

Keywords: Mergers; Oligopoly; Cooperative game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L10 L11 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2005-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-mic
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ftp://ftp.gate.cnrs.fr/RePEc/2005/0507.pdf (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: Monopolization through acquisitions in a differentiated product industry (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gat:wpaper:0507

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