Compétition pour les paiements: une titanomachie revisitée par la modélisation multi-agents

Sandra Deungoue ()
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Sandra Deungoue: GATE, University of Lyon, CNRS, ENS-LSH, Centre Léon Bérard, France

No 810, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: The main purpose of this paper is to study the economics of interchange fee in payment card association. The different arrangements for interchange fees and the nosurcharge rule lower the level of competition intensity that would otherwise have occurred and push interchange fees up. In many countries, competition regulators carried out investigations on the lack of transparency and competition in these card-based payment systems, and took measurements for an optimal determination of interchange fees. To help understand and predict the evolution of payment markets, we use an agent-based model that simulates strategic behaviours for different levels of interchange fee. We thus observe the social welfare and the intensity of competition on both the buyer and seller sides of intermediate markets.

Keywords: agent-based models; payment systems; two-sided markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E47 G21 L16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-knm
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gat:wpaper:0810

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