Dynamic models of residential segregation: an analytical solution

Sebastian Grauwin (), Florence Goffette-Nagot and Pablo Jensen ()
Additional contact information
Sebastian Grauwin: Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France, Institut rhônalpin des systèmes complexes, IXXI, Lyon, F-69007, France, ENS-LYON, Laboratoire de Physique, UMR 5672, Lyon, F-69007, France
Pablo Jensen: Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France, Institut rhônalpin des systèmes complexes, IXXI, Lyon, F-69007, France, ENS-LYON, Laboratoire de Physique, UMR 5672, Lyon, F-69007, France, CNRS, Laboratoire d'Economie des Transports (LET), UMR 5593, Lyon, F-69363, France

No 1017, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: We propose an analytical resolution of Schelling segregation model for a general class of utility functions. Using evolutionary game theory, we provide conditions under which a potential function, which characterizes the global configuration of the city and is maximized in the stationary state, exists. We use this potential function to analyze the outcome of the model for three utility functions corresponding to different degrees of preference for mixed neighborhoods. Schelling original utility function is shown to drive segregation at the expense of collective utility. If agents have a strict preference for mixed neighborhoods but still prefer being in the majority versus in the minority, the model converges to perfectly segregated configurations, which clearly diverge from the social optimum. Departing from earlier literature, these conclusions are based on analytical results. These results pave the way to the analysis of many structures of preferences, for instance those based on empirical findings concerning racial preferences. As a by-product, our analysis builds a bridge between Schelling model and the Duncan and Duncan segregation index.

Keywords: Residential segregation; Schelling; dynamic model; potential function; social preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 C72 C73 D62 J15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-upt and nep-ure
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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ftp://ftp.gate.cnrs.fr/RePEc/2010/1017.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Dynamic models of residential segregation: An analytical solution (2012)
Working Paper: Dynamic models of residential segregation: An analytical solution (2012)
Working Paper: Dynamic models of residential ségrégation: an analytical solution (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gat:wpaper:1017

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