Threshold of Preference for Collusion and Interconnection Fees in Different Market Structures: the Tunisian Mobile Market Case

Sami Debbichi and Walid Hichri
Additional contact information
Sami Debbichi: Unité de Recherche AEDD FSEGT, Campus universitaire El-MANAR 1060, TUNIS TUNISIE

No 1307, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: We present a Cournot model that compares the critical threshold of collusion in Duopoly and Oligopoly Markets where the actors are private, mixed or public. We assume that the incentive critical threshold for collusion depends on the interconnection fees. The different threshold values calculated in each Market structure are then estimated, using the OLS method, with variables related to the Tunisian market structures and prices. The Econometric estimation of the different threshold values is consistent with our theoretical results. Our findings can be used by the decision makers to control collusion, by acting on the level of interconnection fees for each market structure and by implementing the suitable market liberalization policies in this sector.

Keywords: Interconnexion fees; Collusion; Market Structure; Private sector; Public Sctor; Tunisian Mobile Market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D47 L13 L51 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ara and nep-com
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
ftp://ftp.gate.cnrs.fr/RePEc/2013/1307.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Threshold of preference for collusion and interconnection fees in different market structures: the Tunisian mobile market case (2018)
Working Paper: Threshold of Preference for Collusion and Interconnection Fees in Different Market Structures: the Tunisian Mobile Market Case (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gat:wpaper:1307

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Nelly Wirth ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).