Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on differences

Mostapha Diss and Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi ()

No 1402, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: The main criticism to the aggregation of individual preferences under majority rules refers to the possibility of reaching inconsistent collective decisions from the election process. In these cases, the collective preference includes cycles and even could prevent the election of any alternative as the collective choice. The likelihood of consistent outcomes under two classes of majority rules constitutes the aim of this paper. Specifically, we focus on majority rules that require certain consensus in individual preferences to declare an alternative as the winner. In the case of majorities based on difference of votes, such requirement asks to the winner alternative to obtain a difference in votes with respect to the loser alternative taken into account that individuals are endowed with weak preference orderings. Same requirement is asked to the restriction of these rules to individual linear preferences, whereas in the case of majorities based on difference in support, the requirement has to do with the difference in the sum of the intensities for the alternatives in contest.

Keywords: Majorities based on difference of votes; Majorities based on difference in support; Probability; Transitivity; Triple-acyclicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pol and nep-sog
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Related works:
Working Paper: Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on differences (2015)
Working Paper: Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on differences (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gat:wpaper:1402

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