Economic Rationales of Exclusive Dealing; Empirical Evidence from the French Distribution Networks

Muriel Fadairo () and Jianyu Yu ()
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Muriel Fadairo: Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne,F-69130 Ecully, France, Université Jean Monnet, Saint-Etienne, F-42000, France

No 1405, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: This paper investigates the rationales of exclusive dealing (ED), which is one of the most common forms of vertical restraint and attracts intense policy debates in anti-trust regulations. Based on a survey of the theoretical literature, we derive several hypotheses relative to the anti- and pro-competitive motivations of ED. These hypotheses are submitted to French data regarding several types of distribution networks in a wide range of sectors. Considering the industry features, our empirical analysis indicates that in the French distribution system, ED contracts tend to be procompetitive. The evidence suggests that the motivation of ED mainly lies in its positive role to foster the investment of upstream firms.

Keywords: Exclusive dealing; Vertical restraints; Competition policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C12 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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ftp://ftp.gate.cnrs.fr/RePEc/2014/1405.pdf (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: Economic Rationales of Exclusive Dealing; Empirical Evidence from the French Distribution Networks (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gat:wpaper:1405

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