Promoting socially desirable behaviors: experimental comparison of the procedures of persuasion and commitment

Cécile Bazart, Mathieu Lefebvre and Julie Rosaz ()
Additional contact information
Julie Rosaz: Univ Lyon, Université Lumière Lyon 2, GATE UMR 5824, F-69130 Ecully, France

No 1907, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: In a series of experiments, we test the relative efficiency of persuasion and commitment schemes to increase and sustain contribution levels in a Voluntary Contribution Game. The design allows to compare a baseline consisting of a repeated public good game to, respectively, four manipulation treatments relying on: an information strategy, a low commitment strategy, a high commitment strategy and a promise strategy. We confirm the advantages of psychologically orientated policies as they increase the overall level of contribution and for some, that is commitment and promises, question the decreasing trend traditionally observed in long term contributions to public goods.

Keywords: Experiment; Persuasion; Commitment; Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D91 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Promoting socially desirable behaviors: experimental comparison of the procedures of persuasion and commitment (2019)
Working Paper: Promoting socially desirable behaviors: experimental comparison of the procedures of persuasion and commitment (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gat:wpaper:1907

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