A characterization of Approval Voting without the approval balloting assumption

Federica Ceron and Stéphane Gonzalez ()
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Federica Ceron: Paris School of Economics, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Université Paris-Est Créteil

No 1938, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: We provide an axiomatic characterization of Approval Voting without the approval balloting assumption. The dichotomous structure of the informational basis of Approval voting as well as its aggregative rationale are jointly derived from a set of normative conditions on the voting procedure. The first one is the well-known social-theoretic principle of consistency; the second one, ballot richness, requires voters to be able to express a sufficiently rich set of opinions; the last one, dubbed no single-voter overrides, demands that the addition of a voter to an electorate cannot radically change the outcome of the election. Such result is promising insofar it suggests that the informational basis of voting may have a normative relevance that deserves formal treatment.

Keywords: Informational basis; balloting procedure; Approval voting; Evaluative voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: A characterization of Approval Voting without the approval balloting assumption (2019)
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