Slowdown antitrust investigations by decentralization

Emilie Dargaud () and Armel Jacques
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Emilie Dargaud: Univ Lyon, Université Lumière Lyon 2, GATE, UMR 5824, F-69130 Ecully, France

No 2017, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: When multi-product firms make simultaneous price-fixing agreements in different markets, the introduction of leniency programs may induce firms to compartmentalize their activities. Doing so results in slowdown antitrust investigations and decentralized ?rm can easily request leniency for a second cartel after the detection of an other. We study how variation of fine reduction may produce procompetitive but also procollusive effects.

Keywords: Collusion; antitrust policy; leniency programs; multimarket contact; organizational form (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 L22 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-mic
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ftp://ftp.gate.cnrs.fr/RePEc/2020/2017.pdf (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: Slowdown antitrust investigations by decentralization (2020)
Working Paper: Slowdown antitrust investigations by decentralization (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gat:wpaper:2017

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