An Experimental Test of Algorithmic Dismissals

Brice Corgnet

No 2302, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: We design a laboratory experiment in which a human or an algorithm decides which of two workers to dismiss. The algorithm automatically dismisses the least productive worker whereas human bosses have full discretion over their decisions. Using performance metrics and questionnaires, we find that fired workers react more negatively to human than to algorithmic decisions in a broad range of tasks. We show that spitefulness exacerbated this negative reaction. Our findings suggest algorithms could help tame negative reactions to dismissals.

Keywords: Algorithmic dismissals; laboratory experiments; distributive justice; work satisfaction; social preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D23 D91 M50 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: An Experimental Test of Algorithmic Dismissals (2023)
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