Ratification and veto constraints in mechanism design

Vianney Dequiedt ()

Working Papers from Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL)

Abstract: The note points out some restrictions imposed by the notion of ratification. This notion is widely used in the mechanism design literature that assumes that each agent has a veto power. We exhibit allocations that are note ratifiable and nevertheless can be implemented through a mechanism that gives veto power to the agents.

Keywords: MECHANISM DESIGN; PARTICIPATION CONSTRAINTS; RATIFIABILITY; VETO (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gbl:wpaper:200606

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